Wednesday, April 30, 2008
FAA History Lesson -- April 30
From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...
”Apr 30, 1975: The Secretary's Task Force on the FAA Safety Mission (see Jan 28, 1975) submitted its report. The Task Force commended FAA for having reestablished a no-fault aviation safety reporting program (see Apr 8, 1975), and made recommendations including:
* That FAA should continue to rely on industry for safety compliance inspections required in the certification process, but should strengthen its technical staff and improve its ability to monitor the performance of those delegated safety responsibilities. In addition, FAA should insist on more comprehensive design reviews in major aircraft and engine certification.
* That FAA should conduct audits in cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board to ensure that problems cited by NTSB were worked out satisfactorily.
* That FAA's rulemaking process, judged too slow, should be expedited by means of a priority system; the agency should also improve the clarity of the rules themselves and speed up their legal review. * That FAA should take steps, including use of flight data monitoring systems, to improve aircrew performance.
* That air traffic controllers should give more attention to preventing collision with the ground, and that a standing group of FAA and aviation community representatives should review air traffic control procedures with the aim of increasing clarity and standardization.
* That FAA should continue as part of the Department of Transportation, but should not be subject to undue supervision by the Office of the Secretary.
* That an intensive review should be made of the FAA headquarters organization with the object of reducing the number of elements reporting to the Administrator. The task force recommended also that (1) a similar study be made of the FAA regional organization, with a view to consolidating regional functions and reducing the regions in number, and (2) that regional Engineering and Manufacturing (E & M) personnel engaged in aircraft certification be transferred from the regions to one or more E & M technical field centers that would report to FAA Headquarters at a level just below the Administrator.
* That FAA should strengthen its long-range research and development activity and establish one or more technical advisory committees. “
Don Brown
April 30, 2008
Labels:
FAA,
Federal Aviation Administration,
History
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Time Too
The pressure on the FAA just keeps on building. They managed to make Time magazine this week.
Air Traffic Controller Sounds Alarm
With air traffic controllers having operated for more than 600 days without a new contract from the FAA, morale among them is at an all-time low, and with just 11,100 fully trained professionals serving the entire country — the smallest number in 16 years — a combination of fatigue and frustration is laying a dangerous groundwork.
Because of the cover up at DFW, a lot of incidents across the entire country are under review by more people than would normally review them. And sooner or later, an incident is going to come across the desk of somebody that hasn’t partaken of the FAA kool-aid. Or, more likely, somebody will blow the whistle on others before others can blow the whistle on them. The phrase “no honor among thieves” comes to mind. Perhaps one of my mother’s favorite sayings fits better: “Be sure your sins will find you out.”
The truth always comes out -- sooner or later. Better that it come out sooner -- rather than after an accident.
Don Brown
April 29, 2008
Labels:
"Time" magazine,
Congressional Oversight,
Controller shortage,
cover up,
DFW,
FAA
Monday, April 28, 2008
FAA ReAuthorization -- Action Required
Attention All Regular Readers
Read it, sign it, send it. Today.
Bring S1300 to the Senate floor and vote YES!!!
That is all.
Don Brown
April 28, 2008
Labels:
FAA Reauthorization,
Senate
Connected Dots
I got an e-mail from John at the Aviation Mentor pointing me towards a post about secondary airports he had written at the end of last year. You see, he reads James Fallows’ blog like I read James Fallows’ blog, and James Fallows had read my blog, which means the Aviation Mentor read my blog and now I read his blog. I’m lost now too but somehow we’re all talking about VLJs (Very Light Jets) and how they are going to work in the National Airspace System.
Read this -- Three Kinds of Lies -- and you’ll be connected too.
(Switch subjects...) I liked John’s latest post on “T-routes” -- How Low Can You Go ? We appear to be kindred spirits from opposite sides of the microphone.
”You may be wondering why these new MEAs are called "GNSS MEAs" (Jeppesen uses the term "GPS MEA"). GNSS is an international standard and the U.S. GPS/WAAS is just one implementation of that standard, or at least it will be when all the international requirements are met. As we used to say in the software world - "The nice thing about standards is that there are so many of them." “
Not only standards, but databases too. I’ve never figured out why URET uses the Jeppsen database instead of the FAA’s own database. But now we’re getting way off into geek-land. If you know what an MEA is, you might want to check out his site. You’ll learn something.
Don Brown
April 28, 2008
Labels:
"Aviation Mentor",
GPS,
James Fallows,
T-routes,
VLJs
Saturday, April 26, 2008
Not Quite Free Flight
The May edition of The Atlantic is out and my cyber-friend James Fallows has an interesting article in it.
Taxis in the Sky
As I’ve mentioned before, Mr. Fallows uses the term “Free Flight” on occasion. As a matter of fact, he wrote a book with the term in its title -- Free Flight: Inventing the Future of Travel
The article explains the complex interaction between emerging technologies that hold the promise of this new form of transportation. I’m not convinced that the market for Very Light Jets (VLJs) is as extensive as its proponents would like it to be but Mr. Fallows presents a convincing case for their use as air taxis. It’s an interesting article and well worth your time.
I would like comment on the apparent absence of one element though -- Air Traffic Control. The article makes clear that the company highlighted -- DayJet -- has examined the business in incredible detail. As an example:
”The answer involves an odd assemblage of talents and disciplines that includes American computer scientists who call their specialty “ant farming”; Russian mathematical prodigies who made their way from Minsk and Moscow to Florida, via Jerusalem; Internet-business pioneers; and, yes, pilots and maintenance experts and dispatchers, including many refugees or retirees from the troubled airlines. Plus Bruce Holmes himself, who joined the company a year ago, after NASA radically cut back its airplane-related activities to shift its resources to space exploration. “
To me -- an ex-air traffic controller -- the absence is glaring. It seems to me that a company that will interact with air traffic control on a daily basis would have covered this base. Perhaps they have. But it’s been my experience that other businesses haven’t. From companies relocating their flight departments to governments choosing a location for a new airport -- it seems as if little (if any) thought has been given to air traffic control considerations.
Don Brown
April 25, 2008
Friday, April 25, 2008
Still Incompetent
Every once in a while, you read something that just sticks with you. It happened when I read Thomas Oliphant’s recent book, “Utter Incompetents
”Another reason the Dubai (Dubai Ports World) deal fiasco is such a perfect metaphor is that it doesn’t matter what your views on the merits of the issue are. You can believe that it was perfectly straightforward commercial transaction... You can believe it was probably a sensible transaction but deserved very careful scrutiny... Or you can believe that in this new and dangerous environment it is simply not prudent...
It doesn’t matter. Whatever your point of view, Bush’s handling of this mess was inept from start to finish, the real reason it ultimately collapsed.“
That thought -- implanted by Mr. Oliphant’s book -- was brought back to the surface today when I read this story from The Washington Post.
Bush Plan To Contract Federal Jobs Falls Short -- Scope and Savings Have Not Met Goals
”"The competitive sourcing initiative did little to improve management, produced a ton of worthless paper, demoralized thousands of workers and cost a bundle, all to prove that federal employees are pretty good after all," said Paul C. Light, a professor of government at New York University's Wagner Graduate School of Public Service. “
In short, President Bush took what was a Clinton program (remember Al Gore’s Reinventing Government ?), tossed in a strong dose of ideology, mixed it with a lethal dose of incompetence and failed to accomplish anything. Except for ruining the lives of more U.S. citizens of course.
Continuing in the vein of Mr. Oliphant’s book, even if you agree with the ideology (and I most definitely do not) you have to cringe at the incompetence. Because the program was handled so poorly, it will prove to be politically difficult to continue or expand the program in the future should anyone desire to. It has a proven track record -- Bush’s track record -- of not working.
Obviously, President Bush doesn’t run the government by himself. It’s in this area -- when you delve into it -- that shows his incompetence. Here’s a trick I use whenever I read an article on-line and you can use it too. A Mr. Clay Johnson III is mentioned in the article. So I looked him up on Wikipedia.
”Clay Johnson III is the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget at the White House.
Prior to becoming OMB Deputy Director, he was the Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel. He has served President Bush since his tenure as Governor of Texas, achieving the rank of Chief of Staff prior to leading the Bush-Cheney presidential transition. “
A hand-picked political appointee. You might want to lay the blame for the program at his feet but President Bush still picked him.
In the comments section of the article, another name popped up -- David Safavian. So, I looked him up.
”David Hossein Safavian (born August 4, 1967) is a former chief of staff of the United States General Services Administration (GSA) and a figure in the Jack Abramoff lobbying and corruption scandal. In 2004, he was an employee of the Office of Management and Budget. He was arrested and charged with crimes in connection with the Abramoff corruption scandal. He was convicted and, on October 27, 2006, sentenced to 18 months in prison. “
“In 1997, Safavian and Grover Norquist founded a lobbying firm, the Merritt Group, which was renamed Janus-Merritt Strategies (and is sometimes referred to as "Janus Merritt" or simply "Janus"). The tenor of the firm was fiercely ideological. "We represent clients who really do have an interest in a smaller federal government," Safavian told Legal Times in a 1997 interview. "We're all very ideologically driven, and have a bias in favor of free markets." He went on: "We're not letting people who offer us money change our principles."”
Time and time again you find people with the “correct” political ideology in the Bush Administration failing to administrate effectively. Ideology trumped competency. The damage that has been done is colossal.
Those of us in aviation don’t have to look any further than the contracting out of the FAA’s Flight Service Stations to know that the true agenda was ideology as opposed to a matter of practical governance. The contracting out of FSS has been a disaster no matter how you look at it. One of the supposed tests for determining whether to contract out a job is called “the Yellow Book test.” If you can find a job in the yellow pages of the phone book it might be a candidate for outsourcing. You won’t find a listing for Flight Service Specialists in the Yellow Book. You will find a listing for secretaries. The FAA never contracted out the secretaries. Just the FSS controllers.
I wasn’t contracted out and I (for one) won’t forget it. Imagine how the people that were contracted out feel about it. How would you feel if your pension was sacrificed on the altar of someone’s political ideology ? Even worse, it becomes clearer every day that the ideology was ineffective -- administered by people that were incompetent at best and criminal at worst. Do you think they’ll vote Republican ?
Civil Service, mine safety, port security, mortgage lending, Iraq, New Orleans. Incredibly diverse issues all bound together by a common thread -- an incompetent Administration.
Don Brown
April 25, 2008
Runway Headline
Runway incursions have reached the top. Front page of The New York Times -- first story. (Please note that it’s written by the reporter I’ve mentioned several times -- Matthew Wald.)
For Airlines, Runways Are the Danger Zone
”But what really worries aviation specialists? Runway collisions. “
It’s true. I was having a conversation with an airline-pilot friend just yesterday. We agreed that the next major accident would most likely be caused by a runway incursion. I went on to say, “But (I’m a safety guy, I’ve always got a “but”) it could be anything -- anywhere.
That’s the problem (if you can call it that) with a system as safe as ours -- you just don’t really know where the next “big one” will be. All you can do is look at the data -- searching for trends. Which is the reason yesterday’s story in The Washington Post was important.
”Federal Aviation Administration managers covered up mistakes by air traffic controllers at a Texas facility, making it more difficult for authorities to detect safety hazards in some of the nation's busiest airspace, FAA officials disclosed yesterday. “
GIGO -- Garbage In, Garbage Out. We must have good data in order to come up with good policy decisions. That might remind you of the lack of commitment the FAA has shown in collecting good data. Remember I provided these quotes from Air Safety Week ?
””The White House announcement rings hollow, especially given FAA declarations about the need for "data-driven" safety programs. ASRS is a primary source of precisely such incident data. “
” As an appalling illustration of the impact of budget cuts, of some 35,000 ASRS incident reports received annually, only about 30 percent wind up in the data base. The staff cannot handle them all, so must decide which of the reports are the most worthy of keeping. “
Another subtext in this post is the fact that aviation safety is in the headlines of major publications. It has been my (limited) experience -- since I retired and I am able to track the news more closely -- that reporters and editors have a developed sense for what will become news. There is something out there that is about to break open and they are trying to get ahead of it. The sharks smell blood in the water and they are circling -- searching for its source.
Don Brown
April 25, 2008
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Google Finance
I was monkeying around with some charts at Google Finance and thought -- you might not know about Google Finance. I don’t know much about money but it’s fun to play around with it anyway.
You can make interesting charts with it.

LUV -- Southwest Airlines
DAL -- Delta Airlines
AMR -- American Airlines
NWA -- Northwest Airlines
You can even provide a link to the chart so others can monkey around with it.
Maybe the guys at Google can teach the airlines how to make money by giving away stuff.
Don Brown
April 24, 2008
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Bittersweet Goodbyes
I’m always a little hesitant to send you over to read Garrison Keillor’s stuff. It’s not that he’s bad or anything -- he’s brilliant. But I know that he isn’t everyone’s cup of tea and his subjects tend to be a little off base for my readers. But today, I can send you over there with a clear conscience.
Singing the Delta Blues
That’s as in Delta Airlines blues. Garrison mourns the possible passing of Northwest Airlines. It’s odd, in that this sounds just like Atlanta’s hometown airline -- Delta.
” The company was founded by romantics, men who loved aviation, and in 1989 it fell into the hands of rapacious bandits who ate its heart and plunged it headlong into debt and could be as cruel to employees as any other big union-busting corporation. “
I don’t remember exactly which year it was that Delta crossed the line -- but it did. It went from being the pride of Atlanta to just another big business with no soul. Just another casualty in the war of attrition that we called airline deregulation.
Delta’s proposed merger won’t solve anything for anybody. A friend of mine asked me just tonight to explain how any company can lose $6 billion dollars and still be viable. There is no explaining it. It can’t. The only winners in all this will be the lawyers, thieves and bankers. And I’m not too sure about the bankers.
I don’t know how long we will continue to suffer this self-inflicted misery. It pains me to point out that Jimmy Carter signed off on this mess. I think history will be much kinder to President Carter than this current generation but that is another story. The point is that I believe airline deregulation was a mistake. It’s a mistake that we can correct. And the sooner -- the better.
Don Brown
April 23, 2008
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
Public Pressure
It’s amazing what a little public pressure can do.
From Aviation Week:
FAA Bill Could See Senate Vote Soon
”The intense public scrutiny FAA is receiving over the aircraft inspection issue has convinced senior Democrats they can’t leave the FAA bill sitting on the backburner.“
The reporter is about as right as he can get in such a short story.
”The key obstacle preventing the FAA bill reaching the Senate floor for a vote is a clause requiring a $25 user fee for airspace users to fund ATC modernization.“
The bigger issue for controllers in the language in the House version of the bill that should get them back to the bargaining table. President Bush (of course) has threatened to veto the bill. Pretty interesting in that it hasn’t even made it out of the Senate aviation subcommittee.
It will be interesting to watch the three Presidential candidates -- all three are Senators -- on this one.
Don Brown
April 22, 2008
Labels:
"Aviation Week",
FAA Reauthorization,
S1300,
Senate
Safety What ?
Here’s the “headline” for the day:
FAA Names Robert Tarter Head of Air Traffic Organization Safety
Who ? To what ?
”General Tarter's distinguished military career combined with his experience as an airline pilot and safety professional brings extraordinary capability to our ranks," said Acting Administrator Robert Sturgell... “
(yaaaaaaawn) Yeah, yeah, whatever. Somebody wake me up when the FAA wakes up. Another ex-military guy and airline pilot to tell civilian air traffic controllers how it’s supposed to be done. Good luck with that.
No offense to General Tarter -- he might be the nicest, most talented general in the world for all I know. And I don’t know. I’ve never heard of him. I searched around the ‘net to see who he was replacing -- to see how many different people have held the position since the Air Traffic Organization was formed in the FAA -- but quickly gave up. I seem to remember some admiral being in charge of safety back when I was working.
Somewhere between making headlines and improving safety at the air traffic controller level...whatever it is these guys do just slips away into the quagmire that is FAA management culture. Controllers won’t even notice when he reports for duty -- or when he leaves. Pretty sad for an outfit where “safety” is supposedly job one.
Don Brown
April 22, 2008
Monday, April 21, 2008
FAA History Lesson -- April 21
From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...
”Apr 21, 1958: An Air Force jet fighter collided with a United Air Lines DC-7 near Las Vegas, Nev., killing both occupants of the fighter and all 47 persons aboard the airliner. Another midair collision between a military jet and an airliner occurred on May 20 when a T-33 trainer and a Capital Airlines Viscount collided over Brunswick, Md. This second accident cost the lives of one of the two persons aboard the T-33 and all 11 aboard the Viscount. The twin tragedies spurred governmental action already underway to improve air traffic control and to establish a comprehensive Federal Aviation Agency. (See May 21 and May 28, 1958.) “
You’ll see a lot of the 50-year-anniversary stories this year. As noted above, there will most likely be another on May 20th. That one, today’s and the Grand Canyon mid-air collision in 1956 make “the big three” that finally motivated the Federal Government to create a National Airspace System unified under civilian control -- the FAA.
I found a story in the Las Vegas Review-Journal on the event this weekend and I think it’s worth your time. I hope you’ll note that the people interviewed don’t talk about government policy -- they talk of the loved ones lost. Even after 50 years. That is what makes policy important -- the impact it has on plain, ordinary people. Just like you and me.
Don Brown
April 21, 2008
Speaking of Bob...
Trust me. The fact that I brought up his name this weekend was just plain, dumb luck. But I’ll take it. In today’s New York Times you will find a very good editorial from none other than Bob Crandall, the ex-CEO of American Airlines. I agree with about 90% of it so I won’t quibble about the other 10% right now. It’s just nice to see somebody finally talking good sense.
Charge More, Merge Less, Fly Better
Don Brown
April 21, 2008
Sunday, April 20, 2008
India Looks to FAA
Under the heading of “things could get worse.”
We’d best hope ATC doesn’t get contracted out to India.
Mayday! ATC shortage spells turbulence
Don Brown
April 20, 2008
Labels:
air traffic control,
Controller shortage,
FAA,
India
One Other Thing
There is always one other thing when you write a blog. I was just reminded when I was visiting one of the aviation BBSes that I frequent. In my blog entry “There You Go Again”, one of the writers of the Wall Street Journal editorial I discussed was Robert W. Crandall.
Someone else made the same bad assumption that I had made, that Robert Crandall was Bob Crandall, the ex-CEO of American Airlines. Not so.
Robert W. Crandall of the Brookings Institution “focuses on telecommunications regulatory policy. “
Robert Lloyd Crandall of American Airlines focused on crushing his competition.
My favorite story about Bob Crandall (of American Airlines) came from Thomas Petzinger’s book “Hard Landing
”You %$#&ing academic eggheads ! You’re going to wreck this industry !”
...then turned around and left. Neither knew who it was. Allegedly, it was Bob Crandall -- then head of marketing for American.
It turns out he was right. Despite that, he did what he had to do to ensure American Airlines’ survival. American is now the largest airline in the world. At least until the next merger.
Don Brown
April 20, 2008
Saturday, April 19, 2008
Back to Books
Some of you may have noticed that I don’t talk about the books I’ve been reading as much as used to. I still read them. I just stopped writing about them. I’ve pondered the implications of letting any hint of commercialism on my blog and I’ve finally decided I can live with it.
Don’t worry, I don’t believe it will change my outlook and I don’t intend to let it influence my writing. For now at least, I intend to limit it to my book-reading interest. In that there aren’t many books about air traffic control safety (you would think I’d take the hint) I don’t believe I’ll run across any ethical problems. I know you might not worry about my ethics (at least I hope you don’t) but I do.
Anyway, before I blather on too much, just be advised -- any links to book titles you see in the future will take you to Amazon. I’ll slowly but surely go back through my blog and change any previous links. I hope that won’t make anybody crazy with the RSS feeds.
I’d like to thank the readers that allowed me to poll them about this change to my blog. It was kind of you to give me some of your time and share your opinions. I appreciate it.
Don Brown
April 19, 2008
Labels:
"Get the Flick",
Amazon,
Books
There You Go Again
Perhaps it is a pathological ignorance -- it certainly seems to be contagious.
”The last crash of a commercial jet occurred in November 2001... “
That is a quote from yet another editorial in The Wall Street Journal on the subject of aviation safety. Maybe I’m just stupid and can’t understand the English language. “Last” -- “crash” -- “commercial” -- “jet” -- “November 2001.” Am I missing something ?
From Wikipedia:
”Comair Flight 191, or Delta Air Lines Flight 5191, was a scheduled U.S. domestic passenger flight from Lexington, Kentucky, to Atlanta, Georgia, operated on behalf of Delta Connection by Comair. On the morning of August 27, 2006, the Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet that was being used for the flight crashed while attempting to take off from Blue Grass Airport in Fayette County, Kentucky, four miles (6 kilometers) west of the central business district of the City of Lexington. “
Again, am I missing something ? Wasn’t Comair 191 a “crash” involving a “commercial jet” ? 2006 was after 2001 wasn’t it ? Supposedly these guys did some research. It says so right in the editorial.
”In our research on the subject, examining available empirical evidence, we could not find any discernible improvement in safety that was associated with regulations...
I wonder how they missed the crash of Southwest 1248 ? Granted, Chalk 101 wasn’t a jet and Pinnacle 3701 wasn’t carrying any passengers but they were still “commercial” and they still “crashed.” I somehow think that the loved ones of the 34 people who died aboard American Connection 5966 and U.S. Air Express 5481 find the fact that they were not on a “jet” relevant.
Perhaps the authors were too busy researching regulations -- instead of safety -- to find all those. Let me point the way for future researchers. PlaneCrashInfo.com is a super site for quick research. It’s obviously a labor of love. Maybe the Brookings Institution and the Wall Street Journal are thrown off by the site’s lack of commercialism. You needn’t be. I’ve been using it for years without any ill effects.
But back to the subject at hand. Frankly, I’m flabbergasted by this editorial. I seriously don’t know if the authors are trying to twist the truth or if they are just that ignorant about the subject -- or think the rest of us are.
The crash referred to in the opening paragraph of the editorial was American Airlines flight 587. The tail snapped off when the pilot made some “aggressive” control inputs after encountering wake turbulence. Halfway through the editorial you read, “Of course, American Airlines and other carriers hardly need the FAA to tell them how to operate their $50 million MD-80s safely.” What’s the logic of that statement ? American Airlines can have an accident with an Airbus 300-600 but not an MD-80 ? Is it a misunderstanding of the respective roles the FAA and the airlines play in aviation safety or a deliberate attempt to confuse those roles in the public’s mind ?
If this editorial is about aviation safety -- the title is “Airlines Are Safer Than Ever“ -- it misses the mark. Badly. It appears to me that it’s just another excuse to bash Congressman James Oberstar’s oversight of the aviation industry in an attempt to head off any regulation that might hobble the WSJ editorial board’s sacred cow -- “the free market.”
See if this line of thought helps illuminate the subject.
There hasn’t been a mid-air collision involving a commercial jet in the United States since August 31, 1986. That in no way should make you believe that our air traffic control system is the safest it has ever been. Safety is not defined by a lack of accidents so much as it is a measure of risk. There is always the possibility of a “freak” accident in a very safe period just as there is “good luck” during an unsafe period.
The “safest period in aviation history” was on September 12, 2001 when all commercial flights were grounded after the terrorist attacks. Everything before and since has been riskier. Make no mistake about it, commercial air travel is incredibly safe. It’s maintaining that level of safety that is important. The way to do that is by monitoring and evaluating the risks. Every person involved in air traffic control realizes that experience counts and that the experience level of the ATC workforce is declining. That doesn’t mean it is unsafe. It means that we should be vigilant and should be prepared to implement programs to mitigate unacceptable risks.
The best example to demonstrate the difference between no accidents and measuring risk is a couple of videos I’ve pointed you to before. The lack of an accident when two airliners miss by 37 feet is not an indication that the system is safe. It is most definitely a sign that the level of risk may have risen to an unacceptable level. That fact that there were two such incidents -- on opposite sides of the country no less -- is an indication that these weren’t “freak” incidents (bordering on accidents) and that we have a problem we need to address before it causes an accident.
There is one other thing to note in that line of thought. If either of those two incidents had been an accident -- if they had hit -- I’d still be able to say there hasn’t been a mid-air collision involving a commercial airliner in the United States since August 31, 1986. And it would still be an empty, irrelevant and misleading statement on which to base an opinion of the safety of our current aviation system.
Don Brown
April 19, 2008
Friday, April 18, 2008
Press Alert
If you’re a member of the Press (and I know you’re out there), you need to run over to The FAA Follies and file today’s blog away some place safe. Trust me, you’ll need it sometime down the road. The guys at the Follies are still on the inside -- working for the FAA -- and they will have a better sense of how the program is going than I will.
The story is about ERAM. I told you to keep your eyes open for this program on February 18. I can not overstate the importance of this program as far as air traffic control. This is the Big One, the Whole Kit and Kaboddle, the Alpha and Omega. Unfortunately, it is going to be real difficult for most of the Press to understand the significance -- much less explain it to John Q. Public. But that is what the Press does and I have faith that they will find a way.
Let me try out what I am sure will be one of a long line of imperfect analogies. The FAA -- through Lockheed Martin -- is trying replicate the Great Pyramid of Giza. Obviously, we now have better engineering and equipment so the task ought to be easier. But what we don’t have is the lessons learned from the mistakes. Think about how old the pyramid is and how little was known about the principles of engineering when it was built. I’m sure lots of lessons were learned from mistakes but we don’t know what those mistakes were. We just have the final product -- the pyramid -- and we know that it can be done.
The program that runs the air traffic control system now is a lot like that. It was written back in the infancy of software engineering. I’ll make the assumption that the software guys are schooled in the “ancient” principles of software design (probably a really bad assumption) and can figure out the logic of the code. But I assure you, they aren’t schooled in the “ancient” principles of air traffic control. And the kicker is, neither are most air traffic controllers. The logic of that will be mysterious indeed.
Think back to the days before computers and before radar. You have to take the information for every single flight -- the route of flight, the altitude, the speed, the type aircraft, etc. -- and transmit that information along the entire route of flight of the aircraft. Any change to that information -- a different altitude, a route deviation, a speed change, etc. -- has to be transmitted in real time. It has to be done with precision.
How much precision ? Let’s look at just one factor -- speed. Back in the day when all aircraft were required to be on fixed routes -- airways -- you separated aircraft at the points where the routes crossed -- intersections. Crossing aircraft at the same altitude were separated by time -- 10 minutes. The speed of an aircraft as measured across the ground changes constantly due to the winds changing constantly. Thus, the time an aircraft was supposed to pass over a particular fix (say an intersection) was always referred to as an estimate. Cessna 12345 is estimated to cross the MULBE intersection at 12:13.
Remember, we’re just dealing with precision right now. We’ve already demonstrated that we are limiting the precision. We don’t say the aircraft is estimated over MULBE at 12:13 and 17 seconds, or 45 seconds. We limit our precision to one minute. If that were indeed the case, every time the aircraft was one minute late or one minute early over the fix, we would have to recalculate -- and communicate -- a revision to the estimate for the next fix. Remember, this is without radar or computers. Back in the day, revisions to the estimates were communicated via telephone. “N12345, revised estimate, estimating STAIN intersection at 12:36.” That would be a lot of telephone calls. So after some trial and error, some real-world experience and some calculations, the requirement for passing a revised estimate was set at 3 minutes -- early or late.
==============
2-2-6. IFR FLIGHT PROGRESS DATA
”b. Forward position report over last reporting point in the transferring facility's area if any of the following conditions exist:
1. Time differs more than 3 minutes from estimate given. “
==============
A programmer needs to ask himself a question, “Why 3 minutes ?” The fundamental objective is to separate airplanes -- not limit the number of telephone calls made.
Telephone calls aren’t even made any more. In my day, revised estimates were sent by computer. If someone put the wrong speed into the computer you’d get 3, 4 or 5 time updates via the computer and you would know to look for a erroneous speed entry. And you would fuss about somebody not catching the error because all the time updates were distracting you from your duties -- separating airplanes. With the implementation of URET, the computer no longer sent time update messages to the controller. The computer just updated the revised time automatically. So nobody noticed overdue aircraft anymore. “Losing” an airplane is considered bad form in air traffic control. Pilots tend to frown on it also -- when they crash, nobody notices an overdue aircraft and, therefore, we fail to start search and rescue operations.
Mercy. I hadn’t planned to go this far afield when I started this post. I just wanted to give you a glimpse of how complicated this business is and just how complicated a computer program to accomplish it all will be. Just one tiny area -- the precision with which we calculate the speed of an aircraft across the ground -- has dozens of implications and pitfalls. But the real challenge will be designing the system to handle the aircraft when the ERAM program crashes. That is the reason the 3-minute-revised-estimate rule is still in the controller’s handbook. Computer programs, on occasion, crash. When they do, controllers still have to separate the airplanes. Computer or no computer, radar or no radar.
Think about that while you watch this. If your computer freezes or crashes during the video, be assured, the airplanes keep moving at few hundred miles per hour and every, single one of them has people on board. Somebody has to ensure that they stay separated.
Don Brown
April 18, 2008
Labels:
"The FAA Follies",
air traffic control,
ERAM,
Lockheed Martin,
URET
Thursday, April 17, 2008
FAA History Lesson -- April 17
From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...
”Apr 17, 1978: National Weather Service meteorologists began working at 13 of FAA's Air Route Traffic Control Centers under a recently signed agreement between the two agencies. At each of those centers, a team of three NWS meteorologists provided information on hazardous weather throughout the day to center controllers, as well as to FAA towers and flight service stations. FAA provided each center with new equipment for receiving data from NWS weather radar and satellites. This new program was part of a general effort to provide pilots with more en route weather information, since the lack of accurate knowledge of hazardous weather, particularly thunderstorms, had been found responsible for several air crashes (see May 19, 1977). NWS meteorologists were already on duty at FAA's national flow control center in Washington, and by Nov 1980 they were stationed at all U.S. mainland en route centers. “
Unfortunately, the FAA’s reputation as “The Tombstone Agency” is well-deserved. This is just another example. I might as well show you this trick. You might want to do some research on your own one day. It’s really simple. Take the date, April 17, 1978, and start reading backwards -- until you find the appropriate accident.
From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...
”Apr 4, 1977: A Southern Airways DC-9 crashed near New Hope, Ga. The pilot attempted an emergency landing on a highway, but the aircraft broke apart and caught fire. The accident killed 62 of the 85 persons aboard, as well as 8 persons on the ground. In addition, one passenger and one person injured on the ground died about a month later. The National Transportation Safety Board cited the probable cause of the crash as the total and unique loss of thrust after the engines ingested massive amounts of water and hail as the aircraft penetrated an area of severe thunderstorms. As contributory causes, the NTSB listed: failure of the airline's dispatch system to provide up-to-date severe weather data; the captain's reliance on airborne weather radar to enter a thunderstorm area; and FAA's lack of a system for disseminating real-time hazardous weather warnings. (See May 19, 1977.) “
You might think we all learned our lesson -- and to some degree we did. But if we were all honest, we’d know there was more to learn -- and still lessons left unlearned.
”NWS meteorologists were already on duty at FAA's national flow control center... “
It doesn’t take a lot of thinking to figure out the FAA was willing to spend the money for capacity (that is what flow control does) but not safety.
” As contributory causes, the NTSB listed: failure of the airline's dispatch system to provide up-to-date severe weather data...“
Anyone who has ever bothered to listen to an airline dispatcher knows that they spend a lot of time filing routes that keep their airplanes out of the severe weather. Just as those that listen to them know that “flow control” will destroy that careful planning by assigning reroutes that take care of the immediate weather (around the airport) at the expense of the weather down the road.
The FAA currently has a great weather display on the controller’s radar displays at the Centers. Unfortunately, they haven’t spent the money to train the controllers on how to interpret what they see and how to use it effectively. Which is the reason guys like me write things like this.
The National Weather Service meteorologists could really help out in the interpretation department. They do (and have) to some degree. They are occasionally allowed to conduct educational type briefings for controllers. Much more daily interaction with controllers -- providing real-time interpretation of thunderstorms -- would be very educational for all. Unfortunately, the NWS guys are distracted, fighting for their jobs too. The powers that be (I think the NWS but maybe the FAA) want to take them out of the Centers and put them all in a central location. You can guess what the motivation is because you already know it isn’t safety.
Don Brown
April 17, 2008
Southern Airways 242
The Wrong Message
This morning, I sent my son a story I was reading at The New York Times web site.
Wall Street Winners Get Billion-Dollar Paydays
Specifically, I pointed out this part:
” Mr. Simon, a mathematician and former Defense Department code breaker who uses complex computer models to trade, earned $2.8 billion. “
Some of you might remember, my son is pretty good with math. (No, sadly/gladly he didn’t make MIT.) I sent him the blurb about Mr. Simon to pique his interest. I’ve always thought my son would have a knack for codes. Of course, I’ve always thought my daughter would make a great lawyer so what do I know ?
I chewed on this story for most of the day. It kept nagging me. Especially this part...
”One manager, John Paulson, made $3.7 billion last year. He reaped that bounty, probably the richest in Wall Street history, by betting against certain mortgages and complex financial products that held them.“
...with this part added in.
”“There is nothing wrong with it — it’s not illegal,” said William H. Gross, the chief investment officer of the bond fund Pimco. “But it’s ugly.” “
Illegal and wrong are two different things. But Mr. Gross is right about one thing -- it is ugly. I chewed on it some more -- and even more -- when I listened to the same story on Marketplace while driving down the road.
”Paulson made his money investing in complex bets against the subprime mortgage market. When these mortgages defaulted last year, Paulson's funds rose as much as 600 percent, and like most hedge fund managers, he pocketed 20 percent of that. Paul Dorf, at Compensation Resources, endorses multimillion dollar packages for corporate executives, but billions makes even him outraged.
PAUL DORF: It doesn't look kosher, particularly if you dig into what they're making their money on.
He says most of the funds making huge profits . . .
DORF: Are betting on commodity prices for oil, the fact that banks are going to fail. “
I’m slow but I finally caught on to what was bothering me. The richest -- and brightest -- guys in America are making their money off of misery. Perhaps it was the previous segment on the radio that pointed out the price of rice (a “commodity”) has doubled in the last few months. Perhaps it was the thought passing through my head that the bright guys were selling mortgages they knew were bad risks, knowing that they could hedge (that’s where the term hedge fund comes from) their bets and make even more. Sort of a “heads I win, tails you lose” proposition. It’s spooky to think that all that might not be illegal.
What makes it wrong is the fact that they didn’t tell anybody. If the best and brightest believed the subprime market was going to go bust -- if they were so sure that they were willing to bet billions on it -- why didn’t they warn anybody ? Too busy making money ?
As this thought occurred to me, I saw my friend Powell pull up, so I hopped out of the truck to talk to him. Powell has been around a few years longer than I have. As I was explaining that these guys were getting rich by betting on the subprime market going bust, it took him about two seconds to figure it out. “Don’t you think they should have warned the rest of us ? That’s just wrong.” I hate it when that happens. Somebody just spits out the right answer on something I’ve been chewing on all day.
I wish I had thought fast enough to keep from sending my son the wrong message. There’s nothing wrong with getting rich. It’s getting greedy that makes it wrong.
Don Brown
April 17, 2008
P.S. For those interested, here’s an interesting story I found while researching this piece. A few people actually have been trying to warn us.