FAA History Lesson -- December 31 Part II

Yeah, I'm late.



From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 31, 1958: The Federal Aviation Agency assumed the full scope of its statutory responsibilities. Under the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act (see Aug 23, 1958) the effective date of appointment of the first FAA Administrator (see Nov 1, 1958) determined the effective date of most of the operative provisions of the act, which were to take effect 60 days from the qualification of the first Administrator. On this date FAA superseded CAA and absorbed certain CAB personnel associated with safety rulemaking. James T. Pyle, the last CAA Administrator, became Deputy Administrator of FAA, a post he continued to hold until Nov 30, 1961 (see Feb 21, 1962).

Dec 31, 1958: The FAA Administrator signed an agreement with the military departments setting forth the conditions for assignment of members of the Armed Services to FAA.“

Don Brown
December 31, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- GCA

I was fascinated when I first read this history. I had no idea that the Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) system was almost chosen over the Instrument Landing System (ILS) as the standard for air traffic control.

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 31, 1945: Dr. Luis W. Alvarez received the 1945 Collier Trophy for his outstanding initiative in the conception of the Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) system and his contribution to its use for the safe landing of aircraft. The Armed Forces had introduced the system during World War II. After the conflict, some urged GCA’s use by civil aviation, while CAA continued to favor the Instrument Landing System (ILS). (See May 2, 1940, Mar 30, 1947, and Apr 3, 1947.) “

”Apr 3, 1947: CAA began in service testing of GCA (ground controlled approach) radar systems at Washington National and Chicago Municipal Airports. This modified radar precision landing equipment had been developed for military use, loaned to CAA by the Army Air Forces, and installed by the Airborne Instrument Laboratory of the Air Transport Association. New York's La Guardia Airport received similar equipment later in the year. (See Dec 31, 1945, and Apr 9, 1947.) Another operational service test, started about the same time at Washington National Airport, involved a microwave early-warning radar (MEW), one of the best long-range sets developed during the war. A joint CAA/Army Air Forces undertaking, this test aimed at developing effective means of coordinating MEW data and information from ATC flight progress boards.“

”Apr 9, 1947: CAA granted its first approval of the Air Forces' Ground Control Approach (GCA) radar device for commercial planes, authorizing its use by Pan American Airways at Gander, Newfoundland. (See Apr 3, 1947, and Jul 11, 1947.) “

”Jul 11, 1947: The House Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, chaired by Representative Carl Hinshaw (R-Calif.), submitted a report recommending creation of a single instrument landing system to safely and economically serve the requirements of both commerce and national defense simultaneously. Addressing the controversy regarding the merits of CAA's Instrument Landing System, known (ILS) and the military's Ground Control Approach (GCA) system, the committee recommended that CAA stop installation of additional ILS equipment. The committee suggested further that the United States proceed with the development of an instrument landing system satisfactory for fully automatic landing, and that the most modern GCA be installed at selected airports. Congress endorsed the report through its Aviation Policy Board in Mar 1948, and recommended, through the Board, that the "single system" program be undertaken.

Meanwhile, on Jul 15, 1947, CAA Administrator Theodore Wright had announced a new civil-military instrument landing system policy. ILS would remain the primary CAA landing aid, but the agency would supplement ILS at busy airports with an element of GCA designated precision approach radar (PAR), along with airport surveillance radar. The Air Force, however, would still rely primarily on GCA, using ILS for heavy planes and as a backup to GCA. (See Mar 30, 1947, and Feb 4, 1949.)“

”Feb 4, 1949: CAA granted authorization for commercial planes to use ground control approach (GCA) radar as a "primary aid" for bad-weather landings. (See Apr 9, 1947.)“

Don Brown
December 31, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 31

This is the busiest day in FAA history I’ve seen by far. I’ll probably put up a couple of other postings today (assuming I can find the time) but I think I’ll start with the most appropriate.

There was an episode on The West Wing entitled “Take Out the Trash Day.” The gist is that it’s a ploy to minimize the damage a bad news story will do to the Administration. December 31 is the ultimate “Trash Day.” Accordingly, the FAA and NASA will release a report today that they had previously tried to bury. Bad news, the FAA and NASA. Let’s look at the history.


From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 31, 1971: FAA terminated its four-year-old policy of granting immunity from enforcement action to airmen reporting near midair collisions. FAA had adopted this policy on Jan 1, 1968, to encourage full reporting of near midair collisions, and thus gather adequate data for developing midair collision prevention programs. In 1969, FAA published a midair collision report based on data collected during 1968; data collected in subsequent years substantiated the findings of the 1969 report. FAA saw no need, therefore, to continue its immunity policy. (See Jul 15, 1969, and Apr 8, 1975.) “

”Jul 15, 1969: FAA issued a study of near midair collisions. To encourage the reporting of such incidents, FAA had granted pilots and other airmen immunity from penalties under the Federal Aviation Regulations (see Jan 1, 1968). This study found that most of the reported near miss incidents of 1968 that were judged to be hazardous had occurred in congested airspace near large airports having air traffic control service, and resulted from mixing controlled traffic with traffic under visual flight rules. On Jul 31, 1969, on the heels of FAA's report, the National Transportation Safety Board released a study of actual midair collisions, which was also based on incidents occurring in 1968. In contrast to FAA's findings on near misses, the Board found that the majority of the 38 real collisions had taken place in uncongested airspace at or near airports without air traffic control service. There was no evidence that adverse weather was a significant factor in any of the 38 accidents. All of the 71 persons killed in the collisions were occupants of general aviation aircraft. A general aviation aircraft was involved in each accident, with three collisions involving air carrier aircraft and one military airplane. On Dec 4, 1969, FAA's near miss reporting program was extended for an additional two years (see Dec 31, 1971). “

”Apr 8, 1975: Acting Administrator James E. Dow announced the establishment of the Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP), designed to provide the agency with information on potentially unsafe conditions in the National Airspace System, effective May 1, 1975. To encourage the reporting of violations, the program granted immunity from disciplinary action to pilots or controllers who filed a timely report. No immunity was granted, however, in the case of "reckless operations, criminal offenses, gross negligence, willful misconduct, and accidents." FAA remained free to take corrective or remedial action necessary for air safety. Although such immunity programs had been instituted before (see Jan 1, 1968), the ASRP was the first not limited to reports of near midair collisions. The program's establishment anticipated one of the recommendations being prepared by the Secretary's Task Force on the FAA Safety Mission (see Jan 28, 1975), of which Dow served as Executive Secretary. The Air Line Pilots Association, skeptical of the ASRP, preferred a system in which a third party would process reports and protect their confidentiality. (See Aug 15, 1975.)“

There are about a dozen more entries I could make on this subject but I’ll stop before I lose the entire audience. Slowly but surely, the program morphed into the Aviation Safety Reporting System. During my career, it was -- by far -- the most effective safety program in existence. Much of that effectiveness was because of the trust the program administrators have earned over the years. Trust was a big part of the reason they were chosen to run the program in the first place. Who were these trusted people ? None other than NASA.

I’ll say it again. Most people have no idea how much damage has been done to their government during the Bush Administration. Perhaps the biggest causality of all is trust.

Don Brown
December 31, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 30

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 30, 1963: FAA made public a study completed for the agency by a private research firm with the cooperation of the Air Transport Association. The study concluded that airport surface congestion was the principal cause of airport delays, a finding that corroborated an Aug 1962 FAA staff study. The firm found that runways, taxiways, ramp space, and gate positions were inadequate for modern-day air traffic, particularly during the evening rush hour. Only about one in five flights encountered delay, however, and significant delays were concentrated within a relatively few large airports. “

And some things never change.

Don Brown
December 30, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 29

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 29, 1972: An Eastern Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 crashed in the Everglades northwest of Miami, killing 99 of the 176 persons aboard. Two survivors died later as a result of their injuries in this first fatal crash of a wide-body airliner. The National Transportation Safety Board cited the probable cause as the flight crew’s failure to monitor flight instruments. Preoccupied with a malfunction of the landing gear position indicator, they allowed the aircraft to descend unnoticed. “

Just in case you’ve forgotten how to do this...

You can go to the NTSB’s “query” page and search. Or in this case, in that we already know the date, you can go to the monthly listing page and look it up. That will get you to the report for this accident and as you can see, there isn’t much there in this case. It does, however, give you the all important accident number: DCA73AZ005.

With that number, you can usually find a lot of other information. I rummaged around a little and wound up at this site: The Crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 . You can learn more than you’d ever want to know about the flight from that web page.

For those old enough to have a few memory cells stimulated, this crash took on a life of its own. There was a book written about the crash, “The Ghost of Flight 401” and a movie was made about the book. Of more earthly concerns, this accident left us with two new rules from the FAA, trying to prevent any future occurrences.

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 24, 1974: FAA published a rule requiring installation of the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) on large turbojet and turboprop airliners. The equipment was to provide both visual and aural signals when the aircraft was less than 2,500 feet above the ground. The rule’s implementation deadline of Dec 1, 1975, was subsequently extended due to persisting technical difficulties, but all major airlines were in compliance by the end of 1976. A rule published on Oct 10, 1978, extended the GPWS requirement to smaller commuter airline turbojets if able to seat as many as ten passengers. (See Dec 1, 1974, and Mar 17, 1992.)“

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Nov 5, 1976: FAA commissioned the first Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system, an add-on computer software feature specially devised for use with the ARTS III radar terminal system, at Los Angeles International Airport. MSAW had the capacity to spot unsafe conditions by automatically monitoring aircraft altitudes and comparing them to terrain maps stored in the computer's memory. If aircraft descended dangerously close to the ground, aural and visual alarms on their consoles alerted controllers who could then radio warnings to pilots (see Oct 28, 1977). Sperry Rand's UNIVAC division developed MSAW under a contract announced by FAA on Jul 17, 1974. The need for such a system had been highlighted by the crash of an L-1011 near Miami (see Dec 29, 1972). “

The rule requiring the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) was also spurred on by another fatal (and famous) accident on December 1, 1974.

Don Brown
December 29, 2007

Frontline Protection

No, not the flea protection...well, on second thought..

It’s a lot like that. Just another one of those mundane tasks in government that Congress never gets any credit for. Except maybe a nice editorial from The New York Times.

Protection for Endangered Whistle-Blowers

Good job, Congress. Of course, Bush has threatened to veto it. I hope no one is surprised any longer.

Don Brown
December 27, 2007

Comprehension Slowly Dawns

As the political pendulem continues to swing, time transforms the voices crying in the wilderness into prophets. And comprehension slowly dawns on the doomed.

National shortage of air traffic controllers worsening

”"We used to have over 70 controllers at Tampa International Airport that were certified professional controllers, we now have 46," said Mark Kerr, VP of National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).”

"Right now we have 22 of 46 who are eligible to retire," Kerr said. "Three more eligible in next three months so if something doesn't change pretty soon a lot of those people will probably be doing the same thing."

Orlando takes note and then Tampa. Next it will be Atlanta or New York or Peoria. The message won’t play any better no matter what the name (or size) of the town. And slowly but surely, the conscience of the country will wake up to the crisis -- We don’t have any air traffic controllers.

Then the question will be asked -- Why ? Then the next one -- What do we do now ? And then it will really start to sink in. You can’t replace experience by hiring people faster. You can’t replace experience by throwing money at the problem. You only get experience with time.

“Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.”

We’re about to learn from experience.

Don Brown
Deccember 26, 2007

What the” L” ?

My buddy Bob always has this strange twinkle in his eyes. It is as if all of life is here for our amusement and he understands this -- even though most of us don’t. This, too, amuses him. I think he’s amused by almost everything.

Bob, being braver than I, is about to embark on a trip around the home planet. He decided to start a blog to document the trip. It’s a personal blog -- not meant for the masses -- but I decided to share it with you anyway. It’s like a treasure hunt for humor. So pay attention if you visit. I’d been there a dozen times before I noticed the crack about the title and the Pages. See if you can figure out what the “L” is going on at:

Atlanta to Atlanta: Around the World by the Book


Don Brow
December 26, 2007

Humanity

American two forty one, Atlanta Center, turn right heading two seven zero, vector for traffic. Expect direct Volunteer in one five miles.

Right now -- right this very second -- some air traffic controller somewhere is uttering words very similar to those -- perhaps even those exact words. A pilot, whom the controller has never met, carrying a plane load of people he doesn’t know, will turn the airplane to a heading of 270 degrees and life will go on. For everybody.

It happens thousands upon thousands of times a day. Unceasingly. Never ending. Without fail. Even with all our known frailties, we humans still find the capacity to trust each other. Despite all the technology available to us -- the true miracles of this modern world -- we take comfort in the humanity of strangers. Someone is watching over us. Though he be a stranger, he is a fellow human being. We trust our humanity more than our technology. I find that curiously hopeful. I hope you do too.

The few will watch over the many today. They’ll make sure that our loved ones get where they’re going -- if safely possible. They’ll deal with the misplaced anger if it is not. Some will take solace in the whispered “thank you”s, the slight nod of recognition or the silent smile of thanks they receive from strangers. And some will keep watch, unseen. Just a trusted voice on the radio.

American two forty one, clear of traffic, cleared direct Volunteer.

Merry Christmas everyone.

Don Brown
December 25, 2007

Mickey Gets the Flick

I really don’t think I need to comment on this editorial from The Orlando Sentinel.

”Our position: The FAA needs to acknowledge -- and solve -- its controller crisis”

“The problem - and the threat it poses -- seems plenty specific, but not to the folks at the Federal Aviation Administration.

At Orlando International Airport, 41 certified air-traffic controllers are staffing the control tower and radar center -- far short of the 69 to 85 controllers who're supposed to be working there.

Don Brown
December 24, 2007

LaGarbage

For those that are just joining us, I’m peeking into the corners where the FAA sweeps their data about airport capacity. The FAA is, of course, a public institution and is expected to tell the truth about various matters. And they do, if you know where to look and how to read “governmentese.” I’m not an expert at either, but I have some practice and I’m more stubborn than most.

Today’s subject is LaGuardia (LGA). Named after new York’s famed mayor, Fiorello LaGuardia, at various times, LGA has been described as the world’s greatest airport all the way down to the bleak, LaGarbage.

Speaking of garbage, let’s look at the numbers from the FAA’s
Airport Capacity Benchmark Reports for 2001 and 2004.

In 2001: ”The current capacity benchmark at New York LaGuardia is 80-81 flights per hour in good weather. “

In 2004: ”The capacity benchmark for New York La Guardia Airport today is 78-85 flights per hour (arrivals and departures) in Optimum weather, when visual approaches can be conducted. “

Once again, we seem to be losing capacity. Or is it gaining ? It’s so hard to tell.

In 2001: ”Current capacity falls to 62-64 flights (or fewer) per hour in adverse weather conditions, which may include poor visibility, unfavorable winds or heavy precipitation.“

In 2004: ”The benchmark rate is 74-84 flights per hour in Marginal conditions, and 69-74 flights per hour in IFR conditions, for the most commonly used runway configuration in these conditions. Throughput may be less when conditions force the use of other configurations. “

Aha ! A ray of hope. An improvement in IFR conditions. From 62-64 in 2001 to 69-74 in 2004. Tsk, tsk. Come, come people. This is governmentese. You have to read the whole thing. ”Throughput may be less when conditions force the use of other configurations. “ The 2001 stats didn’t make any such disclaimer. I’m assuming it was an average “throughput”, considering all “configurations.”

As far as truthiness (copyright 2005 -- Stephen Colbert), I’d have to go with the 2001 report.


” • LaGuardia operates close to its good-weather capacity for nearly 8 hours of the day, but these traffic rates cannot be sustained in adverse weather.

• In 2000, LaGuardia had the highest rate of delays in the country. Over 15% of all flights at LaGuardia experienced significant levels of delay (more than 15 minutes). Average delays vary from 47-52 minutes in both good and adverse weather.

• In good weather, LaGuardia’s scheduled traffic is at or exceeds capacity most of the day.

• In adverse weather, scheduled traffic exceeds capacity 12 hours of the day. “

Oh, and this last line.

”• This data does not reflect the effects of the slot lottery that took effect recently, on February 1, 2001.“

I have to say, though, when it comes to truthiness (copyright 2005 -- Stephen Colbert), the 2004 report is not without its charms.

”In the following charts, please note that a number of hourly traffic points fall outside the calculated capacity curves at LGA, especially in IFR conditions. There are many possible reasons why this may occur without affecting operational safety, including efficient sequencing of aircraft and above-average controller and pilot performance. Also, actual weather conditions during the hour may have been better than the hourly readings in the database, allowing more efficient ATC procedures than were modeled. “

(emphasis added)

Say what ? Controller and pilot performance is recognized in an FAA capacity report ? Holy Smoke ! That doesn’t bode well for the immediate future does it ?

As I keep saying, there is a finite amount of capacity for any runway. It doesn’t get any better until we change the rules. Most of the rules are safety rules and they won’t be changed.

Once you accept that “benchmark” -- that truth -- it’s all downhill. There are a myriad of factors affecting capacity but all of them take away from the maximum number. Less controllers equals less capacity. Less talented controllers equals less capacity. Some of my sharper readers may have noticed that LGA’s capacity isn’t that much lower than JFK’s which is kind of strange considering the runway layouts. (LGA and JFK) It’s hard to explain the type of traffic JFK handles and its effect on capacity -- in 800 words or less. Or in a nontechnical way. Or in a culturally and politically sensitive way. JFK handles a lot of overseas flights -- lots of “heavy” aircraft that require additional spacing for wake turbulence and being flown by pilots to whom English is a second language. A lot of things take away from the maximum capacity of a runway.

Don Brown
December 24, 2007

Truth is Stranger

This probably didn’t hit the non-aviation crowd the same way but...

Baby Jesus getting GPS for Christmas

I think I’ll let this pass without any further comment.

Don Brown
December 23, 2007

Say It Ain’t So

I don’t get it. These guys sound surprised.

Menendez may hold up nomination of FAA chief

”Sen. Bob Menendez (D., N.J.) said yesterday that he might hold up the nomination of Robert Sturgell to be administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration until he was satisfied with the agency's response to questions he had raised about the airspace-redesign plan.”

”He and U.S. Reps. Rob Andrews (D., N.J.) and Joe Sestak (D., Pa.) complained at a joint news conference that the FAA had reneged on public statements that it would not start using new routes for planes taking off from the Philadelphia and Newark airports until next summer. “

You mean the FAA lied to you guys ? Say it ain’t so. Welcome to the controller’s world.

Now, what are you going to do about it ?

Don Brown
December 22, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 21

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 21, 1955: CAA and the Air Force announced an agreement under which CAA would for the first time use USAF Air Defense Command radar for civil air traffic control. Under the arrangement, CAA used information from the Air Defense Command radar at the Olathe, Kan., Naval Air Station to maintain approach control at nearby airports. CAA commissioned the facility for this use on Jan 15, 1957. “

Don Brown
December 21, 2007

Cui Bono ?

I could stay on this kick for a good long while. If you bothered to go to that “Airport Capacity Benchmark 2004” link I provided, you could have picked up a bonus -- the Airport Capacity Benchmark for 2001. I know, I know -- that’s what you have me for.

The link for the entire report downloads a broken file (in case somebody at the FAA might want to fix it) so I had to be content with downloading individual reports. Let’s stick with JFK in that everybody seems stuck on that airport this year.

For JFK in 2001:


• The current capacity benchmark at John F. Kennedy International Airport is 88-98 flights per hour in good weather.

• Current capacity falls to 71 flights (or fewer) per hour in adverse weather conditions, which may include poor visibility, unfavorable winds or heavy precipitation.

Just for comparison...which the FAA says you shouldn’t do because the methodology has changed...which they change on a regular basis so you can’t track trends...but their reports are junk anyway as discussed previously....

Good weather capacity at JFK 2001 -- 88-98 flights per hour.

Good weather capacity at JFK 2004 -- 75-87 flights per hour.

Bad weather capacity at JFK 2001 -- 71 or less flights per hour.

Bad weather capacity at JFK 2004 -- 67 or less flights per hour.

So, it would appear that capacity at JFK is actually declining. Isn’t that interesting ? Technology had 3 years to boost capacity yet it didn’t. What happened ? Let’s see.

The report goes on to say:

• In 2000, almost 4% of all flights at Kennedy experienced significant levels of delay (more than 15 minutes).

• Periods of excess arrival and departure demand can be handled efficiently during good weather conditions, but cannot be sustained in adverse weather.

• In adverse weather, scheduled traffic exceeds capacity for more than 5 hours in the day.

• On adverse weather days, about 9% of the flights are delayed significantly (more than 15 minutes). “

• Technology and procedural improvements are expected to improve Kennedy’s good weather capacity benchmark by 2% (to 90-100 flights per hour) over the next 10 years.

• The adverse weather capacity benchmark will increase by 3% (to 73 flights per hour.

That is a good place to pause. Bad weather capacity will increase by 3%. But it didn’t. It declined. It decreased from 71 to 67. That math genius tells me that is a 5.4% decrease. And while we’re having fun with numbers, I want to emphasize this point. Look at the number of airplanes we’re talking about here folks. It’s 1, 2, 3 maybe 4 per hour. We’re talking about billions of dollars to get 2 more airplanes per hour on the runway.

Let’s move on.

• These capacity increases could be brought about as a result of:

– ADS-B/CDTI (with LAAS), which provides a cockpit display of the location of other aircraft and will help the pilot maintain the desired separation more precisely.

– FMS/RNAV Routes, which allow a more consistent flow of aircraft to the runway. – Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) – allows use of independent arrivals for some parallel runway configuration. These benefits are not reflected in the benchmark value, however, since they apply to different runway configurations than those identified for the optimum and reduced rates.

• Demand at Kennedy is projected to grow by 18% over the next decade indicating that delays are expected to increase in the future.

Right off the bat it’s “could be”. ADS-B is going to save the day -- 7 years ago in 2001. CDTI (I had never even heard the term and I’ve only been retired 13 months) sounds great but depends on equipping the entire fleet to get a couple more airplanes per hour on the runway. Let me ask the question -- Then what ?

Let’s say we can accomplish all this. Using technology, we can get the bad weather arrival rate up to good weather arrival rate. Then what ? Technology will give you a 3% increase (2 airplanes) per hour and demand is expected to increase 18% in the same time frame -- 10 years ? Is that worth $20-40 billion ? Atlanta’s new runway cost over a billion dollars but that will handle around 60 airplanes per hour. At even half that rate it’s a better bargain than ADS-B/CDTI.

Are you getting the flick yet ? You need to ask the age-old question -- Cui Bono ? To Whose Benefit ? Who benefits from a $20+ billion dollar, government-mandated program ? Even if it works, the runways will still be overscheduled. There will still be delays. It will still snow and snow plows will still have to clear the runway. Thunderstorms will still occur and nobody is flying through one of those -- ADS-B or no ADS-B. There will still be delays.

I’ve already established for you that there is a finite capacity to runways. Even if NextGen --ADS-B/CDTI/GPS/etc.-- works, you still run into that brick wall -- finite runway capacity. Then what ?

Why spend $20+ billion on NextGen instead of runways ? Cui Bono ? Did the paving contractors forget to send in their campaign contribution ?

Don Brown
December 20, 2007

Wiggle, Evade and Dodge (or Air Traffic for Dummies II)

“"These Holiday Express lanes in the sky will give airlines the wiggle room they need to avoid backups, evade weather, and dodge delays,” Secretary Peters said."

So, now they’re “Holiday” express lanes. I can’t wait for the acronym-crazy FAA to fully embrace that one -- HEL. But let’s focus on the Wiggle, Evade and Dodge.

I’m confused about the Secretary’s announcement..

” She said the new measures developed at the direction of President Bush this fall include an agreement to cap hourly operations at JFK International Airport, plans for hourly limits at Newark and capacity improvements for the region, and were based on input from a multi-month process that involved airlines, airports and consumer advocates.”

Is it an “agreement” or a regulation ? Is it enforceable ? Who signed their names on the proverbial dotted line ? Some might think I’m quibbling but I’ve watched these people call their imposed work rules for air traffic controllers a “contract” for over a year and I assure you, no controller has agreed to this “contact” much less signed it. Wiggle, Evade and Dodge.

Speaking of controllers, I assume you noticed their absence in this latest “agreement” ? “...based on input from a multi-month process that involved airlines, airports and consumer advocates.” Don’t you think it just a little bit odd ? The people that actually have to make HEL work -- the controllers -- aren’t consulted ? In this case, I’d be happy if the Secretary Peters would consult with the FAA.

” “These new measures will cut delays, protect consumer choice, support New York’s economy, and allow for new flights as we bring new capacity online,” Secretary Peters said.”

“New capacity” huh ? I wonder where that is coming from ? That doesn’t agree with what I was reading this morning -- another long, boring FAA report: “Airport Capacity Benchmark 2004”. The casual reader will NOT be interested in downloading this report. It is 5+megs of the most confusing charts you would ever want to see and is chock full of evasions, caveats and obfuscation. Wiggle, Evade and Dodge.

Buried in the section on JFK airport is this:

”NEW YORK – New York John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) Benchmark Results

• The capacity benchmark for New York John F. Kennedy International Airport today is 75-87 flights per hour (arrivals and departures) in Optimum weather. The benchmark remains the same in Marginal conditions.

• The benchmark rate decreases slightly to 64-67 flights per hour in IFR conditions, for the most commonly used runway configuration in these conditions. Throughput may be less when ceiling and visibility are low, or when other runway configurations are in use due to wind direction or for noise abatement.”

One page further down is this little tidbit:

”Planned Improvements at JFK are not expected to affect the benchmark rates.“

Interpretation. Secretary Peters (holding a really big hammer) has convinced the airlines to limit the number of operations at JFK to 82-83 operations per hour. Delays will go down during good weather. In that 82-83 flights an hour still exceeds the bad weather capacity (IFR -- Instrument Flight Rules) of 64-67 flights per hour, when the weather worsens the delays will start piling up and the airlines will still blame the weather just like they do now. Despite what Secretary Peters might want you to believe, it still comes down to the runways. If you want more capacity, build a runway. Even the FAA says so. On page 11 of that benchmark report.

”For those airports operating close to capacity, technological and procedural changes could have a significant impact in improving the capacity benchmark. In general, the greatest benefit is derived from adding a new runway.”

I know what you’re saying, “But Don, it says right there, “...technological and procedural changes could have a significant impact...”” Yep. You see, I read things differently than most people. Let me dissect it for you so you can have the flick too.

First off, it says “could”. It doesn’t say “will.” It’s saying, “well...maybe.” When you read these things, always look for “and.” For instance: “...technological and procedural changes”. There is a reason it doesn’t say, “Technological changes will improve capacity.” You think I’m just picking nits don’t you ? I’m not. Let me show you.

On the same page, the report also says this: “CEFR will increase the benchmark capacity in Marginal conditions.” That sounds great. There’s no Wiggle, Evade and Dodge in that sentence. But what is CEFR ? See page 4.

”CDTI -Enhanced Flight Rules (CEFR) allows suitably equipped aircraft to maintain visual separation from other aircraft and continue visual approaches even in Marginal weather conditions.”

Okay. What is CDTI ? See the note at the bottom of the page.

”Cockpit Display of Traffic Information”

Okay. So if the airplane is equipped with CDTI and if the crew is rated for CEFR...”CEFR will increase the benchmark capacity in Marginal conditions.” And then it hits you -- you didn’t look up “Marginal”. Most people give up. I don’t. I look it up. Besides, the section on JFK (quoted above) says: “The benchmark remains the same in Marginal conditions.“ Does your head hurt yet ?

I’ll spare you another agonizing wild goose chase. Here’s the part that throws the whole report into question.

”For the purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that all aircraft at these 35 airports will be suitably equipped [with CDTI] by 2013; actual equipage will probably be less.“

I assume their assumption is incorrect also. Wiggle, Evade and Dodge.

Don Brown
December 20, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 20

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...

”Dec 20, 1985: DOT published a new rule on allocation of takeoff and landing reservations ("slots") at the four airports subject to flight quotas under the High Density Rule (see Mar 6, 1984). Beginning on April 1, 1986, any person might buy, sell, trade, or lease air carrier or commuter slots (with the exception of international and essential air service slots, which were subject to certain transfer restrictions). A lottery procedure was provided for allocation of new slots, or slots returned under the rule's use-or-lose provision. On Mar 12, 1986, DOT issued a special rule aimed at increasing competition: 5 percent of slots at high density airports would be assigned by lottery to new entrants and incumbent air carriers with fewer than 8 slots. Although the High Density Rule was subsequently amended in certain other respects, its main provisions remained essentially unchanged despite opposition from some parts of the aviation community. On Jun 16, 1995, DOT released a report on the issue and announced its conclusion that, on balance, the rule was currently beneficial. “

Don Brown
December 20, 2007

Playin’ the Slots

Politicians sure like to make things complicated. I think we’re supposed to believe the issues are complex. I get the feeling it’s more like a game of three-card-monte though. See if you can follow along.

First up, we have today’s story from Matthew Wald at The New York Times.

For Now, U.S. Won’t Cap Flights Per Hour at J.F.K.

”WASHINGTON — The United States transportation secretary will announce on Wednesday that her department has negotiated an agreement with the airlines to ease congestion at Kennedy International Airport next summer by shifting some flights to less busy times, according to government officials and industry executives.

As a result, the department will not, at least for now, order a reduction in the number of flights per hour at Kennedy, they said. “

Is anybody surprised ? Please tell me you aren’t. Summer is over folks. Crisis over. It’s back to business as usual. Read the story and soak up all the subtleties. They’ll do something like the “express lanes” for Christmas and they’ll study it some more (and delay and delay some more.) Check out Senator Schumer’s statement and see if you can figure out why it looks like he’s playing a game of Twister.

Now, lets review and see how we got here. I feel like I’ve put at least a dozen history lessons up about landing slots. Let’s see. There’s one here, here, here and here.

Here’s another one from a few years after the FAA’s history book was published.

DOT EXPANDS ACCESS TO SLOT-CONTROLLED AIRPORTS
FOR SMALLER COMMUNITIES, NEW-ENTRANT CARRIERS

FAIR-21, which also authorizes programs of DOT’s Federal Aviation Administration for the next three years, directs that all slot restrictions be eliminated on July 1, 2002 at O’Hare, and Jan. 1, 2007 at the two New York airports.“

Speaking of complicated...you should read the whole thing. But I’m going to move on. Did you notice the date for the New York airports -- Jan. 1, 2007 ? Do you remember which year delays spun out of control ? But what about Chicago O’Hare ? The restrictions there were eliminated in 2002. Let’s see how that worked out.

”April 22, 2004

U.S. Orders Further Cuts in Air Traffic at O'Hare
By MATTHEW L. WALD

Despite an order by the Federal Aviation Administration to reduce traffic at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, delays became worse there in March. As a result, the agency will order deeper cuts, the transportation secretary announced on Wednesday.

The F.A.A. expects a return of air traffic to levels before the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and is trying to avoid a return to the kind of congestion that produced. In January, it said it had won agreement from the two biggest carriers at O'Hare, United Airlines and American Airlines, to reduce flights 5 percent from 1 p.m. to 8 p.m. But on Wednesday, the transportation secretary, Norman Y. Mineta, said the two airlines would cut flights by 2.5 percent more during that period and reduce flights from noon to 1 p.m. as well. “

I included the blurb about the attacks on 9/11 to remind those not in aviation that air traffic dropped off dramatically in their aftermath. Always keep that in mind as you’re reading any statistics about air traffic. Everything was reaching saturation in the year 2000-2001. In that regard, the air traffic system got a real break -- some breathing room -- a chance to rebuild. And the Bush Administration -- in the form of Marion Blakey and the FAA -- squandered it. You can cut them some slack if you choose to, in that you may think they were preoccupied. They weren’t.

Retirement of Air Controllers Poses Problem, Official Says
By MATTHEW L. WALD
Published: March 18, 2004

Towards the bottom of that story you’ll also see this:

”John S. Carr, president of the union, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said on Wednesday that another problem was that the aviation agency had delayed or eliminated several new technologies meant to improve capacity.

Ms. Blakey said a possible solution was to allow controllers to work beyond 56. But Mr. Carr said that this was not a good idea because the stress of working in busy air traffic jobs ''fries you like a fritter.''”

You’ll notice that my buddy John Carr (of The Main Bang fame) had a way with words even back then. And if his words occasionally sound a little shrill, think about what he knows now. When the FAA got a once-in-a-lifetime chance to get ahead of the power curve and get the ATC system staffed...they instead were plotting the demise of the ATC system.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Congress and the FAA are still playing with the slots. Runways aren’t roads. There isn’t any “stop and go” traffic in the sky. There is only “go” -- even if you can only go in circles. If you “stop” you fall out of the sky and die. You just can’t wish real hard and expect a landing slot to appear. If you want more landing slots you have to pour some concrete. A lot of concrete.

When you hear the next airline spokesman complain that the FAA wants to “take us back to 1969” with slot restrictions, ask yourself a question: How many new runways have been opened in New York since 1969 ?

You may think these guys are playing games but they’re gambling with lives.

Don Brown
December 19, 2007

P.S. I’ve been somewhat overtaken by events. Mr. Wald has an updated story out now.

Lawyered Up

Andrew Cohen has good entry on his blog at The Washington Post.

White House to Military Lawyers: Keep Quiet

”Here is another terrible idea from the Bush administration: The White House now wants to politicize the promotions process for attorney-soldiers. To uniformed lawyers who often put the rule of law ahead of their own interests, the message is as clear as it is cynical and short-sighted: If you want a promotion, stop criticizing U.S. policy in court, no matter how legally flawed it may be.“

In other words, they want to pick lawyers the way the FAA picks supervisors -- don’t criticize us no matter how unsafe a policy might be.

It’s hard to believe anyone is running for President. From sub prime mortgages to the military to the FAA to Iraq...How would you like to be the person cleaning up this mess ?

Don Brown
December 18, 2007

Good Government

My regular readers have often heard me make the case for good government. One of them sent me to a site where that is the main topic.

Government is Good

I’ve been slowly working my way around the site -- it has a lot of information on it -- and I bumped into a section that really hit home for me.

The Case FOR Bureaucracy

”In Massachusetts alone, Blue Cross/Blue Shield employs 6682 workers to cover 2.7 million subscribers. This is more people than work in all of Canada’s provincial health care plans, which cover over 25 million people.”

That makes a powerful case for national health care insurance. But that isn’t my forte. This is.

”Myth No. 3: We Want the Government to Act Like a Business “

”Conservatives are constantly saying that we would all be better off if government were run like a business. But would we? Businesses are obsessed with their bottom lines and are always looking for the cheapest way to make a product or deliver a service. But in many cases, we don’t want government services to be as cheap as possible. Often, with government, the main concern is the quality of the service, not its costs. For example, do we really want to spend the least amount of money possible on our air traffic control system? Obviously not – the main goal should be maximizing the safety of the aviation system.”

I always thought it was obvious. It’s nice to see that somebody else does too. The thought of a bankrupt ATC system isn’t really very comforting is it ?

Don Brown
December 18, 2007

FAA History Lesson -- December 18

From the FAA Historical Chronology, 1926-1996...


”Dec 18, 1992: Eight fatalities occurred when a Cessna 550 crashed after encountering wake turbulence behind a Boeing 757 during descent into Billings, Mont. The National Transportation Safety Board subsequently cited the probable cause as the pilot’s failure to follow established wake turbulence procedures. Nevertheless, the accident increased concerns that 757 wake turbulence might represent a special problem, an issue raised within FAA by Chief Scientist Robert Machol. (See Nov 1, 1975, and Dec 15, 1993.)”

” Dec 15, 1993: Five persons died when an Israel Westwind aircraft following a Boeing 757 encountered wake turbulence and crashed at Santa Ana, Calif. The National Transportation Safety Board later found the probable cause to have been the Westwind pilot’s failure to maintain adequate separation behind the 757 and/or to remain above its flight path during approach. The Board considered a related factor to be inadequacy of air traffic control procedures regarding visual approache